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Abstract
For ad hoc networks to realize their potential in 
commercial deployments, it is important that they 
incorporate adequate security measures. Selfish 
behavior of autonomous network nodes could greatly 
disrupt network operation. Such behavior should be 
discouraged, detected, and isolated. In this paper, we 
propose a reputation-based mechanism to detect and 
isolate selfish nodes in an ad hoc network. The 
proposed mechanism allows a node to autonomously 
evaluate the “reputation” of its neighbors based on 
the completion of the requested service.  The 
underlying principle is that when a node forwards a 
packet through one of its neighbors, it holds that 
neighbor responsible for the correct delivery of the 
packet to the destination.  Our mechanism is efficient 
and immune to node collusion since, unlike most 
contemporary mechanisms for reputation-based trust, 
it does not depend on exchanging reputation 
information among nodes.  We also explore various 
reputation functions and report on their effectiveness 
in isolating selfish nodes and reducing false positives.  
Our simulation results demonstrate that the choice of 
the reputation function greatly impacts performance 
and that the proposed mechanism, with a carefully 
selected function, is successful in isolating selfish 
nodes while maintaining false positives at a 
reasonably low level. 
I.   Introduction 
Multi-hop communication in mobile ad hoc 
networks (MANETs) requires collaboration among 
nodes, which forward packets for one another.  Most 
studies of ad hoc networks assume that nodes can be 
programmed to always perform this forwarding 
functionality.  In commercial deployment of 
MANETs, however, some nodes may refuse to 
forward packets in order to conserve their limited 
resources (for example, energy), resulting in traffic 
disruption.  Nodes exhibiting such behavior are 
termed selfish [10].    Selfishness is usually passive 
behavior.  Additionally, malicious nodes may 
intentionally, and without concern about their own 
resources, attempt to disrupt network operations by 
mounting denial-of-service attacks or by actively 
degrading the network performance.  For example, 
malicious nodes could disrupt routing operation by 
advertising non-existent routes or sub-optimal routes.  
Selfish and malicious behaviors are usually 
distinguished based on the node’s intent.  Network 
disruption is a side effect of the behavior of a selfish 
node, while disrupting the network is the intent of 
malicious nodes.  One way to recognize and isolate 
such disruptive node behavior is through trust 
management mechanisms [1] [2] [3] [6]. 
In this work, we focus on detection and isolation 
of selfish nodes in ad hoc networks.  We propose a 
reputation-based mechanism as a means of building 
trust among nodes.  The mechanism relies on the 
principle that a node autonomously (i.e., without 
communicating with other neighboring nodes) 
evaluates its neighbors based on the completion of the 
requested service(s).  We note that this principle, in 
general, can be applied to operations that involve 
cooperation among nodes in an ad hoc network. We
introduce an application of this principle to the 
routing functionality such that nodes are rewarded or 
penalized based on their behavior during packet 
forwarding.  It is to be noted that each node sees many 
different flows with varying routes over time. 
Consequently, the evaluation will not be greatly 
biased by individual flows; rather it seeks to identify a 
pattern of selfish behavior.  This is illustrated in figure 
1.
In the figure, two flows are being carried over 
routes SABXED and MABF. Suppose B starts to act 
selfishly, dropping all packets that it is expected to 
forward. Eventually, nodes upstream of B will notice 
that packets are not being delivered to their intended 
destinations. Node A will reduce the reputation index 
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flows); A’s immediate neighbors will in turn reduce 
the reputation index they assign to A. Once B’s 
reputation index falls below a certain threshold, this 
triggers new route discovery processes, and the flows 
are re-routed to SAMLD and MXEF, bypassing the 
selfish node.  
Previously proposed reputation-based trust 
management schemes primarily rely on the 
monitoring of neighbors’ transmissions and the 
exchange of reputation information among nodes [1] 
[2] [3].  Our protocol provides several advantages 
over such schemes for reputation establishment, 
including: 
1. Routing protocol independence:  Our mechanism 
is based on feedback from the destination and 
hence is independent of the choice of the ad hoc 
routing protocol. 
2. No communication overhead:  Sharing of 
reputation information introduces additional 
control overhead.  Our mechanism introduces no 
such load. 
3. Directional transmission:  Unlike other schemes, 
our mechanism does not require nodes to monitor 
their neighbors’ transmissions.  Hence, our 
proposed scheme is robust to the use of 
directional antennas. 
4. Elimination of an overlay trust management 
system:  Other schemes require a trust overlay to 
evaluate the reliability of reputation information 
shared. 
Figure 1. Operation of the protocol 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows.  In Section II, we explain the main concept 
and features of our mechanism and discuss possible 
variations of the reputation-building component.  In 
section III, we demonstrate through simulations the 
applicability of our mechanism to the fast isolation of 
selfish nodes.  We also evaluate its effectiveness in 
maintaining a low percentage of false positives.  We 
summarize related work in section IV and present our 
conclusions and directions for future work in section 
V.
II.   Reputation-based Mechanism 
A. Description
Our mechanism provides a distributed reputation 
evaluation scheme implemented autonomously at 
every node in an ad hoc network with the objective of 
identifying and isolating selfish neighbors.  Each node 
maintains a reputation table, where a reputation index 
is stored for each of the node’s immediate neighbors.  
Considering a network of nodes in } , , 2 , 1 { N    N ,
ij r  denotes the reputation index of node j as assigned 
by node i, } 1 ) , ( : , {     j i d N j i , where  ) , ( j i d
is the distance in hops between nodes i and j.
A node ascribes a reputation index to each of its 
neighbors based on successful delivery of packets 
forwarded through that neighbor.  For each 
successfully delivered packet, each node along the 
route increases the reputation index of its next-hop 
neighbor that forwarded the packet.  Conversely, 
packet delivery failures result in a penalty applied to 
such neighbors by decreasing their reputation index.  
In other words, when a node transmits a packet to one 
of its neighbors, it holds the neighbor responsible for 
the correct delivery of the packet to the final 
destination.  The indication of a success or failure is 
obtained from feedback received from the destination 
(e.g., using TCP acknowledgements). The function 
used to compute the reputation index is a design 
decision that is influenced by factors including node 
behavior, node location, as well as others. Later in this 
section, we present and evaluate three heuristics for 
the reputation function. 
To prevent selfish behavior and to provide 
motivation for nodes to build up their reputation, each 
node determines whether to forward or drop a packet 
based on the reputation of the packet’s previous hop.
Once a node’s reputation, as perceived by its 
neighbors, falls below a pre-determined threshold all 
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are discarded by those neighbors and the node is 
isolated.  Summarizing, the underlying approach is:  
1. To evaluate neighboring nodes based on the 
completion of the requested tasks (packet 
delivery); and  
2. To detect the completion of a task based on 
feedback received from the end host (delivery 
acknowledgement).
In this paper, the reputation threshold is assumed 
to be global (i.e., same value used by all nodes).   
Alternatively, it can be locally defined according to a 
node’s preference. The significance and impact of 
locally defined threshold values will be explored in 
future research. 
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Figure 2. Flowchart illustration of our mechanism 
B. Operation
We illustrate the operation of our mechanism in 
figure 2.  Each node maintains a lookup table that 
stores information about data packets forwarded 
through it, including sequence numbers, source and 
destination IP addresses and port numbers, and the 
address of the next hop.  Upon receiving a data 
packet, a node i checks whether the packet is a 
retransmission (indicated by the presence of stored 
packet information).  If it is, node i decrements the 
reputation index of the neighbor through which the 
original packet was forwarded.  Node i then compares 
the current reputation index of the previous hop k to a 
reputation threshold  thresh r .  If  thresh ik r r  , the 
packet is dropped.  Otherwise, node i forwards the 
packet after storing its related information in the 
lookup table (creating an entry for new packets or 
updating entries for retransmitted packets).   The size 
of the lookup table can be reduced by using hashing.  
Also, as packets age in the lookup table they can be 
expunged.  
Upon receiving an acknowledgement from node k,
node i verifies whether node k was the node through 
which the corresponding data packet was forwarded 
(recall that this information is stored in the lookup 
table).  If so, node i increments  ik r , rewarding node k
for the successful delivery of the data packet to the 
destination node.  Hence, the algorithm only updates 
neighbors’ reputation indices when the route between 
these nodes and the destination is symmetric. 
The values by which the algorithm increments and 
decrements the reputation index of a node (what we 
call the reputation function) are important design 
parameters.  The sharper the slope of the function, the 
faster the scheme manages to detect a selfish node.  
The tradeoff is that an overly aggressive scheme may 
also result in a higher number of false positives (note 
that false positives may result from packet losses due 
to reasons other than selfish node behavior, such as 
channel conditions, mobility or buffer overflow at 
intermediate nodes).  We investigate three different 
reputation functions and derive conclusions on their 
applicability to different scenarios later in the paper.  
Another design issue is the value of the reputation 
threshold.  A detailed analysis to determine effective 
values of the threshold follows. 
C. Design Considerations 
1. Parameters 
Each node maintains a reputation table that holds 
reputation information about the node’s neighbors.   
Upon encountering a new neighbor k, node i creates 
an entry for that neighbor in its reputation table and 
initializes the reputation index to  0 r rik   .  A node 
updates the reputation of its neighbors based on the 
outcome of packet delivery events as discussed above.  
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incrementing a neighbor’s reputation index up to a 
maximum value  max r , while failed packet delivery 
events result in decrementing the reputation index of 
the neighbor.  A neighbor whose reputation falls 
below  thresh r  is marked as selfish and is blacklisted.  
We note that  thresh r r r ! ! 0 max .
The choice of  0 max max r r  { '  and 
thresh thresh r r  { ' 0  affects the sensitivity of our 
mechanism to packet drop events, which in turn 
affects the performance of the algorithm.  An 
aggressive mode of operation corresponds to small 
values of  max ' and thresh ' , increasing sensitivity to 
packet drop events.  This is likely to result in faster 
isolation of selfish nodes and a considerable number 
of false positives, where a node is falsely identified as 
selfish due to packet drop events unrelated to 
selfishness (such as congestion or collisions).   
Conversely, a more conservative mode of operation 
corresponds to larger values of  max ' and thresh ' ,
resulting in slower isolation of selfish nodes but also 
fewer false positives.  We find that the values of 
max ' and thresh '  should be selected based on factors 
such as network density, average network radius, 
traffic load, and expected number of selfish nodes. 
Consider for example a 4x4 grid network 
topology where each node can establish direct links to 
its neighbors in the horizontal and vertical directions 
(but not diagonally); and two  selfish nodes are 
present in the network (these nodes drop all packets 
received from their neighbors) We generate 80 CBR 
(constant bit rate) flows and set  50 0   r .  Averaged 
over 10 simulation runs, table 1 presents the 
percentage of selfish nodes that are successfully 
isolated (i.e. identified as selfish by all their 
neighbors) by the end of the simulation time and the 
percentage of false positives (i.e. nodes that are 
falsely identified as selfish) , for several choices of 
max ' and thresh ' . Under these conditions, 
30 max   ' and 15   'thresh  achieve a low rate of 
false positives while isolating selfish nodes 
reasonably fast.  
We note that for a scenario where selfish nodes 
drop all 
traffic forwarded through them, increasing the value 
of  max '  while keeping  15   'thresh  does not affect 
the results obtained for isolation.  However, the 
results for false positives are improved.  We use 
50 max   ' and 15   'thresh  for all simulations 
discussed in the remainder of the paper.  
Table 1.  
Comparison of different values of  max ' and 
thresh '  for  50 0   r .  Percentage of selfish nodes 
isolated and false positives are averaged over 10, 
600-sec. simulations. 
2. The reputation function 
The values of increment,   r , and decrement,   r ,
of a neighbor’s reputation index as a result of packet 
delivery events also affect the performance of our 
mechanism.  One way to compare reputation 
functions is by using the ratio    r r / . The higher the 
ratio   r r / , the faster the isolation of selfish nodes, 
but also the higher the number of false positives.   
Next, we present three heuristics for reputation 
functions. 
i. Double Decrement/Single Increment Ratio 
(DDSIR) 
In this scheme, for each successfully delivered 
packet, a node increments the reputation index of the 
next-hop neighbor that forwarded the packet by 
n r    , where n is a positive constant.  For each 
failed delivery a node decrements the reputation index 
of the neighbor by  n r 2    .  This scheme is not very 
aggressive in penalizing neighbors, but at the same 
time mandates a node to deliver at least 66% of the 
packets forwarded through it in order to maintain a 
fixed reputation. 
ii. Hops Away From Source (HAFS) 
This scheme is more aggressive than DDSIR in 
penalizing nodes for dropped packets.  In this 
variation of the algorithm, a node decrements the 
reputation index of a neighbor as a function of the 
number of hops h  between the node and the source 
D.thresh
D. max  5 15  25 
10
-Isolation: 100%  
 at 208.5 
-FalsePos: 6.1% 
-Isolation: 85% 
at  220.5 
-FalsePos: 3.2% 
-Isolation: 75% 
at  335 
-FalsePos: 1.8% 
20
-Isolation: 95% 
at  163.5 
-FalsePos: 3.7% 
-Isolation: 90% 
at  250 
-FalsePos: 1.8% 
-Isolation: 70% 
at  395 
-FalsePos: 0.9% 
30
-Isolation: 95% 
at  153 
-FalsePos: 3.4% 
-Isolation: 85% 
 232.5 
-FalsePos: 1.1% 
-Isolation: 65% 
at  445 
-FalsePos: 0.7% 
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n r    , where n and m are positive constants.  The 
number of hops from the source of the dropped packet 
could be estimated from the intermediate node’s 
routing table.  Thus, on a route where a packet 
delivery failure event occurs, the reputation index of 
the node closest to where the event occurred is 
decremented the most.  The motivation of the 
algorithm is to avoid draining the reputation of nodes 
along a route that includes a selfish node before 
isolation takes place.  This could occur if nodes along 
that route are penalized equally by their previous hop 
neighbors (as in the example discussed in figure 1). 
iii. Random Early Probation (REP) 
This scheme rewards and penalizes nodes 
similarly to DDSIR.  Additionally, a node randomly 
rejects participation in a route with neighbors whose 
reputation is between  0 r  and  thresh r .  As a neighbor’s 
reputation approaches  thresh r  in a node’s table, the 
probability of the node’s participation in a route with 
this neighbor decreases. 
III.   Evaluation
Using ns-2, we study the performance of our 
mechanism.  and compare the three proposed 
reputation functions.  We simulate different static ad 
hoc networks of 
2 N  nodes arranged as an  N N u
grid.  The communication range is set such that each 
node has 4 neighbors, with the exception of edge 
nodes, which have 3 neighbors, and corner nodes, 
which have 2 neighbors. 
We randomly generate sets of 80, 100, 120, and 
140 CBR (Constant Bit Rate) TCP flows, each 
sending 500Kbits of data.  For each set, 25 
simulations are executed with flow source and 
destination pairs selected at random for each run.  We 
rely on TCP acknowledgements and retransmissions 
as indications of successful and failed packet delivery 
events, respectively. 
Our scheme is routing protocol independent, and 
we choose to apply it to AODV for the current set of 
simulations.  AODV’s specifications allow a node to 
maintain a blacklist of neighbors [9].  Neighbors 
identified as selfish (i.e. nodes whose reputation index 
is below the threshold) are included in this blacklist.  
All route requests (RREQs) and route replies (RREPs) 
forwarded by such neighbors will be ignored.   
Moreover, our protocol allows a node to trigger a 
RREQ if it detects a route entry in its routing table 
with a blacklisted next-hop neighbor, thus eliminating 
all selfish nodes from routes.  Eventually, selfish 
nodes will be identified, eliminated from all routes, 
and isolated from the network. 
1. Comparing the proposed reputation functions 
To compare the performance of the three 
proposed schemes, we use a 4x4 topology with 3 
selfish nodes, and an 8x8 topology with 5 selfish 
nodes, as illustrated in figure 3.  For each simulation 
run, data is collected for selfish nodes’ exposure 
(fraction of the neighbors of a selfish node that 
identified it as such) and false positives (fraction of 
links removed from the network due to a node falsely 
identifying one of its neighbors as selfish).  For all 
simulation, we set constants n = 1 and m = 0.5.
A
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F
G
A
B
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D
E
F
G
Figure 3. Topologies used in our simulations: 8x8 
with 5 selfish nodes (c, d, e, f, and g); the lower  
left quadrant shows a 4x4 topology with 3  
selfish nodes (a, b, and c) 
a) Observations 
Results for a 4x4 topology shown in figures 4 and 
5 demonstrate that the exposure value is consistently 
lower for REP than for the other two reputation 
schemes tested.  This is expected since REP is the 
least aggressive scheme among all three.  Our results 
also show that DDSIR and HAFS achieve comparable 
values of exposure.  The results for false positives are 
ordered based on the aggressiveness of the scheme, 
with REP achieving the lowest values, followed by 
DDSIR and then HAFS.  
The results for an 8x8 topology are also shown in 
figures 4 and 5.  The exposure results are sorted based 
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the lowest exposure, followed by DDSIR and HAFS.  
For a higher number of flows the exposure of DDSIR 
approached that of HAFS.  On the other hand, the 
results for false positives exhibit a different trend 
from those for the 4x4 topology.  HAFS was the most 
aggressive and it had the highest number of false 
positives.  However, the number of false positives 
generated by REP was either higher or comparable to 
that of DDSIR.  A discussion of these results follows. 
b) Analysis
i) Effect of average number of hops on the 
performance of HAFS 
The simulation results for the 4x4 topology 
indicate that HAFS and DDSIR achieve comparable 
results in terms of exposure.  This is somewhat 
surprising, since HAFS is a more aggressive scheme 
than DDSIR.  However, looking at the results for the 
8x8 topology, HAFS outperforms DDSIR in terms of 
isolation. These results show the dependency of 
the performance of HAFS on the average number of 
hops that a flow traverses.  The results also explain 
why the effect of HAFS can not be seen for networks 
with a short radius, such as our 4x4 topology (the 
average number of hops for this topology is 2.67, 
compared to 5.36 for the 8x8 topology).  
It is also apparent from figure 5 that the exposure 
results for DDSIR approach those of HAFS as the 
traffic load increases.  However, HAFS will reach the 
same level of exposure faster than DDSIR, as shown 
in figure 6.  This also explains the comparable 
exposure results of HAFS and DDSIR for the 4x4 
topology, since 80 flows is a high traffic load for such 
a network. 
ii) Effect of asymmetric routes on the performance 
of REP 
Simulation results for REP on a 4x4 topology 
showed the lowest false positives amongst the three 
algorithms.  However, the same results for the 8x8 
topology showed unexpectedly high false positives for 
REP as compared to DDSIR for some of the flow sets 
simulated.   We noticed an increase in the number of 
asymmetric routes with REP as compared to DDSIR.  
Since in our protocol symmetric routes lead to a more 
accurate assessment of neighbors’ cooperation, such 
an increase in the number of asymmetric routes 
resulted in an increase in the number of false 
positives.   
Figure 4. Comparison of false positives  
for the 3 proposed schemes 
Figure 5. Comparison of exposure  
for the 3 proposed schemes 
Figure 6. Comparing the 3 schemes based on 
packets dropped by selfish nodes at each level of 
exposure. (Results shown are for 120 flows in an 
8x8 topology.  Similar trend was seen for all other 
simulations) 
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our reputation function, as it consistently generated 
low false positives and high exposure. 
2. Impact on Network Goodput 
Using simulations, we calculated the average 
network goodput in a network with selfish nodes but 
no reputation mechanism (defenseless network), and 
another with no selfish nodes and no reputation 
mechanism in place (safe network).  We use the 8x8 
topology with 5 selfish nodes simulation setup 
described previously.  Our simulation results 
presented in figure 7 show, as expected, that DDSIR 
achieves higher goodput than obtained in a 
defenseless network.  A defenseless network will 
experience a high number of retransmissions and a 
high number of flows (around double the number 
observed in DDSIR) that were unable to deliver any 
packets to their intended destinations.   This is due to 
the presence of selfish nodes in the network that: 
- Drop many packets, resulting in timeouts and 
high retransmission rates for these flows; and 
- Affect the establishment of credible routes to 
their intended destinations. 
Our mechanism was able to avoid such problems by 
isolating selfish nodes from all routes, resulting in a 
higher goodput. The presence of selfish nodes 
decreases goodput by over 11% when no reputation 
mechanism is employed, while our mechanism limits 
that decrease to less than 5.5%. 
3. Effect of Mobility 
In order to asses the effect of node mobility on the 
performance of the proposed scheme, we ran a 
number of ns-2 simulations using the random way 
point mobility model.  We used three sets of 
simulations of 64 nodes with varying average node 
speed and pause time.  For each simulation, we 
calculated the exposure of selfish nodes and the 
number of packets dropped by each selfish node for 
each of its neighbors.  Our results show that the 
average number of packets dropped by a selfish node 
per neighbor decreased as the average node speed 
increases (figure 8), which led to slower isolation 
(table 2).  This is expected due to the decrease of the 
average interaction time between nodes as their speed 
increases.  As a result, a node will forward fewer 
packets through a single neighbor.  Thus, the impact 
of the selfish behavior of a node is minimized.  This 
leads to the conclusion that, for mobile nodes, 
isolation is inversely proportional to speed and 
mobility tends to reduce the impact of selfishness on 
the network. 
Table 2.  
Effect of average node speed and pause  
time on isolation of selfish nodes. 
Each value represents percentage of selfish nodes  
isolated averaged over 10, 600-sec. simulations. 
       Pause/
Avg.Speed
0.1 meter/s  5 meter/s  15 meter/s 
Pause 0  24% 1% 0.35% 
Pause 1  28% 0.97%  0.21% 
Pause 2  29% 0.5%  0.42% 
4. Improvements to Current Mechanism 
a) Storage overhead 
    The fact that nodes have to store packet traces in 
order to distinguish between delivered and 
retransmitted packets results in storage overhead.  We 
ran a number of simulations in order to observe the 
impact of limiting the size of the lookup table on the 
overall protocol performance (isolation time).  We 
tested against two heuristics: 
 Use a FIFO lookup table of 1000 entries; and  
 Assign an expiration time per table entry, which 
is based on estimated flow round-trip time (RTT) 
at each node.  Upon timing out, the entry is 
eliminated from the lookup table. 
Our results indicate that there is a tradeoff 
between the lookup table size and the isolation time.  
By setting an upper limit on the lookup table size, 
there was a slight increase in the isolation time. 
As stated earlier, the size of the lookup table 
could be further minimized by using hashing 
algorithms.  For 1000 table entries, the size of the 
table is about 20Kbytes.  By using a hash value of 
2bytes (1/2
16 collision probability), the table size 
could be further reduced to 2Kbytes. 
b) Reliance on TCP 
            As the protocol relies on acknowledgement
produced by the destination, there is the question of 
its applicability to flows employing UDP.  We believe 
that we can rely on some application layer end-to-end 
acknowledgement mechanism for such scenarios, 
such as provided by the Real-Time Streaming 
Protocol (RTSP). 
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colluding nodes (B and X) 
5. Possible Attacks   
Since our mechanism was designed to handle 
primarily selfish behavior, it is susceptible to a 
number of malicious attacks. We plan to investigate 
possible extensions to this work, including 
mechanisms for providing authentication, 
confidentiality, and message integrity in order to 
deter, detect, and isolate malicious behavior.  
One of the advantages of our mechanism, as 
compared to other mechanisms, is its robustness to 
collusion.  Schemes that rely on sharing reputation 
information require intermediate nodes to inform 
other nodes in the network about a neighbor’s 
selfish/malicious behavior.  Consider the simple ad 
hoc network shown in figure 9.  If nodes B and X are 
in collusion, node B could either not broadcast 
information regarding bad behavior by X (a problem 
in schemes that only maintain negative reputation 
values), or falsely report good behavior by X (a 
problem in schemes that increase reputation based on 
positive reporting).  Since our mechanism does not 
involve exchange of reputation information, it is 
robust against colluding nodes.   
IV. Related Work 
The use of a reputation scheme to judge a node’s 
intent is one of the techniques adopted to detect and 
isolate selfish nodes in an ad hoc network. Different 
reputation mechanisms appear in the literature. We 
can broadly classify these into two categories: 
1. Mechanisms in which nodes exchange reputation 
among themselves; and 
2. Mechanisms in which nodes independently assess 
their neighbors’ reputation based on direct 
interactions. 
A large number of schemes [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [7] 
[8] belong to the first category, with varying 
implementations.  One advantage of such schemes 
could be their quick convergence in detecting node 
misbehavior, especially in a large ad hoc network, due 
to increased information regarding a particular node’s 
behavior.  However, this approach has two potential 
drawbacks: they often assume that nodes that send 
reputation information about their peers are 
themselves trustworthy; and they are subject to 
collusion among nodes that misreport reputation 
information. The algorithm proposed in [6] belongs to 
the second category and deals with establishing 
reputation only via direct interactions with other 
nodes. This is similar in concept to our proposed 
mechanism, but the analysis and inferences reached 
are limited as compared to the work reported here. 
In schemes based on exchange of reputation 
information, the reputation index a node assigns to 
others in the network is based on a combination of 
directly observed behavior (direct interaction) and 
reported behavior (indirect interactions). In order to 
overcome the problem of trust in the reporting of 
reputation information, [1] and [5] propose an 
approach that maintains a reputation value for every 
function in the ad hoc network, including the 
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from the various reporting nodes is then individually 
weighted based on the reputation of the reporting 
node. This solution addresses the problem of trusting 
indirectly observed behavior, but introduces 
complexity in maintaining different reputation values 
for each network functionality. It also does not fully 
address the problem of collusion. Two malicious 
nodes, say A and B, can mount a denial of service 
attack where A systematically reports positive 
reputation information about B, ensuring that B 
remains in the routing tables for other nodes in the 
network, while B systematically drops any packets 
routed through it. Such collusion scenarios are 
difficult to prevent unless the reputation mechanism 
relies primarily on assessing reputation based on 
direct interaction with other nodes, as is the case of 
the mechanism reported in this paper. 
Both [2] and [4] rely on nodes’ operating in the 
promiscuous mode in order to assess whether their 
neighbors are correctly forwarding packets. However, 
it is difficult to constantly switch the network 
interface between the transmit/receive and 
promiscuous modes. In addition, the wireless nature 
of the medium makes the method error prone. Our 
reputation scheme relies on feedback from the 
destination to assess node behavior and, therefore, the 
interfaces do not have to be switched to a 
promiscuous mode of operation. 
Our reputation mechanism, though developed 
independently, is similar in some respects to the work 
reported in [6].  In [6], only a single reputation 
function (simple increment/decrement by a constant) 
is used, and its effectiveness in the fast isolation of 
selfish nodes or the reduction of false positives is not 
reported.  Our mechanism uses more sophisticated 
reputation functions and we provide a detailed 
comparative analysis of three heuristics for the 
selection of an appropriate reputation function.  We 
demonstrate that the reputation function has a major 
impact on the node isolation time and the percentage 
of false positives.  A focus of our current research is 
the optimization of the reputation function.  Another 
major difference is the impact of mobility on isolating 
selfish nodes.  We evaluated our work under different 
mobility scenarios and observed using simulation that 
a highly mobile environment leads to a higher 
isolation time.  
V. Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper, we proposed and described the design 
and evaluation of a reputation-based mechanism that 
isolates selfish nodes in an ad hoc network.  Our 
results indicate that the mechanism is successful in 
achieving fast isolation of selfish nodes while 
maintaining false positives at a reasonably low level. 
We are currently investigating extensions to the 
protocol to detect and isolate various forms of 
malicious behavior emphasizing autonomous 
decisions by individual nodes.    We are also 
interested in investigating the effect of congestion on 
the protocol’s performance.  Additionally, we will 
explore reputation rebuilding mechanisms, which 
allow a node that was labeled selfish and isolated 
from the network to be re-evaluated and reinstituted 
into the network. 
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